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1. Introduction: Why Theory Reduction is
Not Yet Considered in Connection with
Interdisciplinary Relations -  And What can
Be Done About It
In the first place, this approach has to deal with the ques­
tion why interdisciplinarity is not a topic for the philosophy
of science. The answer to this question could be, accord­
ing to Wittgenstein, that a certain picture has taken hold of
the philosophers of science, or even a whole bulk of such
pictures. These pictures obviously are implicit models
about the way sciences do relate. The implicitness of these
models prohibits their philosophical reflection. Hence, the
best philosophy of science can do in this case is to make
them explicit.
One way to make them explicit is demonstrating the
fundamental decisions which lead to the different models.
So it can be shown how they differ from one another and
how they make up more or less similar “families”. It can
also be shown where the place of theory reduction in the
according “family tree” can be found and which branches
of this tree are cut off if one chooses theory reduction. The
purpose of this paper is not to evaluate the different
decisions in a conclusive manner but simply to name them
and to list their advantages and their disadvantages.
2. A Model of the Models of
Interdisciplinary Relations
By tracing the basic decisions that bring about models of
interdisciplinary relations, a kind of “model of models” of
these relations is constituted. The most basic decision
within such a model is whether there are irreducibly many
disciplines or not. Only if we answer this question posi­
tively, we face the problem of interdisciplinary relations in a
strict sense, because only then there are -  and forever will
be -  different disciplines which can relate. But do they
really relate? This is the next basic decision to be made.
If we go for a “No”, we reach the realm of what can
be called pluralist models. According to these models,
there are many disciplines, at least many types of
disciplines, but there are no relations between them. This
is the classic “solution” to the problem of interdisciplinarity
which prevailed until the second half of the 20th century,
e.g. as the separation between the “hard” sciences and the
disciplines of the humanities. Such models succeed in
describing the demarcation between disciplines, but they
do this at the price of an equivocal concept of science.
They are also, from their very foundations, unable to
explain the real cooperation which is going on between
disciplines of different types (Fauser 2003).
If we say, yes, there are relations between different
disciplines, we choose contact models. The next question
is then: What kind of contact is there between the different
disciplines? How is this contact mediated? In the literature,
three alternatives can be found: Contact is mediated either
by common objects or by common methods or by
cooperation. Accordingly, we can distinguish between
object-contact models, method-contact models and
cooperation-contact models.
Object-contact models are the “classical” model of
interdisciplinary relations. It implies that different
disciplines are linked by identical objects to which every
single discipline has its own access, mediated by its own
method. The contact which is supposed to be mediated
this way can come about in two different forms: a
hierarchical form in which one central discipline has a
privileged access to the objects in question, as physics
does in the model of a non-reductive naturalism (Schurz
2006, 38); or a non-hierarchical form in which the several
disciplines form a cluster around their objects (Me Cormick
2003). In both cases, object-contact models are hard to
integrate into a post-Kuhnian philosophy of science which
takes it for granted that science, at last in some cases,
does not access but create its objects so that objects are
not prior to disciplines and therefore cannot guarantee
interdisciplinary contact.
Method-contact models have been popular in the
second half of the 20th century when there was hope for
one method to bring together all disciplines. This method
was conceived of as a formal one describing dynamic
structures; it was (and still is) called “cybernetics”, “theory
of systems” and the like. Again, there is a hierarchical
(Schneider 1966) and a non-hierarchical (Meister/
Lettkemann 2004) variation of such models, depending on
the decision whether there is one central discipline
providing all others with its method or whether there are
independent but coordinated developments of the same
method in different disciplines. Again, these models run
contrary to an insight of current philosophy of science:
Feyerabend’s remark that methods are not of huge
importance for science and that it would not be desirable
to give them such an importance (Feyerabend 1983).
Cooperation-contact models are a very young -  and
promising -  brand of contact-models. They even have
been developed as an alternative to models of
interdisciplinarity as such (Gläser et al. 2004), but only
because of the -  unnecessary -  assumption that these
models are limited to the types discussed above.
According to cooperation-contact models, interdisciplinary
relations are brought about just by the cooperation
between scientists from different disciplines. This
cooperation is not based on common objects or common
methods but precedes their discovery or creation and
development. Since cooperation does not start with
common criteria, it cannot be conceived of as hierarchical.
Rather, it is an action which implies mutual recognition -
notwithstanding the fact that, as a human action, it is also
coined by political, social and other conditions (Bordieu
1988; Münch 2007). Cooperation-contact models have the
advantage of working without the presuppositions found in
object- and method-contact models. They also fit in with
the trend to understand science as action (Gläser et al.
2004). Obviously, they have little normative power. In
contrast to their “object” and “method” colleagues, they do
not say how disciplines are supposed to relate, but this
can turn out to be a strenghth rather than a weakness.
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So far we have examined the “Yes”-branch of the
model of models of interdisciplinary relations. But if we
have to consider theory reduction, it obviously is to be
found on the other side. The basic decision to be made,
then, is that there are not irreducibly many disciplines. If
we decide this way, we do not face a problem of
interdisciplinary relations but rather the problem how to
make the pseudo-problem of interdisciplinary go away by
making all disciplines collapse into only one. So we are on
the side of models which can be named as “monist”.
The advantage of monist models is that they
guarantee -  or at least claim to guarantee -  a single,
univocal concept of science, based on the promised unity
of science. At the same time, such models somehow have
to deal with the (in their view apparent) plurality of
disciplines which even is increasing evermore (Poser
2001, 279-287). Hence, monist models are challenged by
the question: If there is only one discipline, can the single
members of the apparent plurality of disciplines be in some
way identified with that one and only discipline? The
answer “No” leads to eliminative models, because given
monist presuppositions non-identity with the one and only
discipline just means being no scientific discipline at all. To
eliminate here means to demonstrate that the kind of
objects with which a pseudo-discipline claims to deal
simply do not exist and that therefore the terminology used
by that pseudo-discipline is meaningless. This strategy can
be -  and has been -  successful in single cases, as e.g. in
the elimination of astrology from the realm of the sciences.
The recent relevant discussion is focusing on the question
whether disciplines of cognitive science can be eliminated
in favor of neurobiology and in the final analysis of physics
(e.g., as a classical attempt, Churchland 1986). As an
overall strategy for tackling the problem of
interdisciplinarity it is not very popular, though, because it
flies in the face of the intuition that there are many
disciplines which at least have a partial and temporal
justification (Charpa 1996, 96).
Therefore the most promising answer in the monist
branch seems to be “Yes”: At least some members of the
apparent plurality of disciplines can be identified with the
one and only discipline and, through this identification, are
also justified. This is the strategy of theory reduction which,
as such, but without this context, is well researched in the
philosophy of science. Theory reduction can come along in
various kinds, depending on which discipline one takes to
be the goal of reduction. In our time, the most popular
version is physicalist theory reduction (Wilson 1998); but
there also is its sociological counterpart (Luhmann 1990),
and the list could be continued. The final goal here, too, as
in elimination always is to end up with just one scientific
discipline, but before the goal is reached, the different
existing disciplines at least can be tolerated since their
differences from the one and only science are only
apparent ones. Reductive models face similar problems as
eliminative ones: They also do not seem to do justice to
the given plurality of disciplines (Margolis 1987; Rosenberg
1994). Nevertheless, this plurality is just a fact and facts
can change. The hard problem of theory reduction, in my
view, seems to lie elsewhere, and can be found by a look
at the whole model of models of interdisciplinary relations.
3. The Hard Problem of Theory Reduction
The hard problem of theory reduction can be seen in its
contrast to the cooperation-contact models which are the
most important plural models: Contact-models, as has
been shown, imply mutual recognition between the coop­
erating disciplines. This recognition is withdrawn by monist
models. Eliminative models do so immediately, which
makes them so little attractive. Reductive models are more
cautious in this respect, they even promise to give a spe­
cial discipline the dignity of the one and only discipline in
the way of identification. But this identification is a one-way
affair. The identity of the goal-discipline of reduction is
supposed to be unchanging and well-known; the identity of
the discipline which is to be reduced just is an apparent
one; it has been falsely taken to be something apart from
the one and only science. So, in the recognition of a theory
which is to be reduced, the goal-theory of reduction simply
recognizes itself in a disguise which soon is to be re­
moved. However, as Hegel has shown throughout his
Phenomenology of Spirit, recognition from its very concept
always must be mutual; it presupposes two parties recog­
nizing one another. This problem is getting even harder as
we tend to take for real only what science tells us to be
real (Quine 1979). So, if there is only one scientific disci­
pline, no one can recognize it as such, neither from the
outside -  for only science has the authority to do so -  nor
from the inside -  for there can be no mutuality here. The
hard problem of theory reduction, at least as a global
strategy facing the problem of interdisciplinarity, therefore
is: If it is successful, it leads to a situation in which the
supposed one and only discipline can get no recognition at
all. Hence, contact models, and especially cooperation­
contact models do not only seem to be a better description
of the reality of science in our days; they also seem to be a
better way to deal with interdisciplinarity without endanger­
ing the whole concept of science as such.
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